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It is reasonable to say that violence has an enduring 
presence within the fabric of our human world. Its space of 
occurrence ranges from the most daily expressions to those 
exceptional cases which are specific to the phenomenon of war. 
This being the case, it is also reasonable to say that violence 
shapes in some more or less drastic manner the world we live 
in. We accept this statement as the expression of a trivial fact 
and it just might be the case that our plain acceptance prevents 
us from placing its significance into question. In his latest book, 
Violence and Phenomenology, James Dodd tries to pin down 
precisely the bearing that violence has on the way we are and, 
consequently, on the world we occupy. 
  As long as war normalizes, in some respect, the violence 
which is always its central trait, the author considers that there 
is a real possibility to become its dupes, an outcome which 
would be brought about given that we would take it for granted. 
Dodd states that this happens because we either expect too 
much from violence or too little. The first case holds as long as 
we “look to violence either to express a decisiveness of purpose 
or to provide a proof of authenticity that violence cannot in fact 
sustain” (p. 1). Have in mind here, for example, those 
governments that are trying to overcome their weaknesses by 
an excessive use of violence. The second case is effective 
whenever we “believe that violence will simply wither away, 
due either to the weight of our moral vigilance or the 
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that we employ in the hope of avoiding the destruction of war. 
(p. 1).  
In connection with this distinction, Dodd’s purpose 
becomes clear, a purpose which is therapeutic in nature, as long 
as he tries to cure us from our naïve grip on violence. The path 
that would fulfill this purpose is that of a philosophical 
treatment of violence. But this is no easy task, as long as it is 
not even clear that violence is a philosophical object proper. 
There is an important reason for this, namely the existence of 
other disciplines which claim violence as their lawful object. 
Here, the author mentions military science, international 
politics, or law which tend to develop a “technical” approach on 
their object. It follows that philosophy is entitled to move 
toward violence only if it is capable of bringing it in its purview 
in a nontechnical manner.  
To make Dodd’s intentions a little more clear, it is 
necessary to mention that he considers that the discourses on 
violence are possible within the confines of two extremes: the 
former is settled by the so called “stupidity of violence 
principle”, the latter being the one which takes violence to be a 
constitutive event. The mentioned principle reveals violence as a 
mere means, which is to say that it “is thus blind; when taken 
for itself it is ultimately without direction” (p. 11). From this 
point of view violence in and for itself cannot be the proper 
ground for anything lasting. Its stupidity comes into view, for 
example, when, being pursued in an excessive manner, 
undermines the very aim which was set to achieve. Now, to 
take violence as a constitutive event is to reflect on its sense, an 
attitude that assumes that it just might be more than a mere 
means. It is in connection to this that phenomenology comes 
into play, for, as Dodd states, “at the heart of phenomenological 
philosophy is the conviction that all genuine philosophical 
problems are problems of sense, or meaning” (p. 15), or, 
differently put, to treat violence phenomenologically means to 
see how its sense is articulated in lived experience. However, 
phenomenology functions here only as a method of description, 
this being motivated by the fact that violence is a specific type 
of objectivity, which “becomes an acute problem for a BOOK REVIEWS 
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philosophy that seeks to realize itself in the form of a reflection 
on a subjectivity that articulates the sense of things” (p. 149).  
In conformity with what has been laid down above, 
James Dodd’s study aims at a better conception of violence, a 
task which would be brought about if it were revealed as a 
philosophical object proper, which in its turn would amount to 
its recognition not as a mere means, but also as a constitutive 
sense. Having in mind that in his book, the author employs a 
very complex argumentation, I will limit myself in what follows 
to a brief presentation of what precisely signifies to conceive 
violence as the origin of a meaning. This aspect is developed in 
its most comprehensive version in a discussion of Patočka’s 
Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History. This discussion is 
in fact the culmination of a long argument that commences 
from Sartre’s connection between the concept of violence and 
nihilism, continues with detailed presentations of Jünger’s, 
Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of nihilism, to arrive in 
the end at Patočka’s Essays.  
Sartre’s linkage between the concept of violence from the 
Notebooks for an Ethics with nihilism holds due to a specific 
conception of violence: its configuration entails two moments, 
namely one that amounts to a certain type of weakness – Sartre 
speaks here of a certain type of weakness because he regards 
violence as representing the refusal to conform to those laws 
that govern any form of action, a conception that draws its 
sense from the fact that the French author considers power to 
be precisely the ability to conform to those very laws – and, as a 
result of this aspect, we come up against the moment of 
affirmation – which represents the affirmation of the 
inessentiality of things, or, in other words, the inessentialness 
of everything that exists in relation to me and my goal. To 
conceive violence in this dualistic manner is equivalent to “the 
problem of nihilism: the problem of affirmation of the 
nothingness of things” (p. 77). At this point, Dodd’s 
argumentation turns to Jünger’s essay Über die Linie, in order 
to develop a more sophisticated perspective on nihilism. The 
line that is indicated in the title of this essay stands for the 
completion of European nihilism, a moment which, 
paradoxically, would “represent the inauguration of a new, META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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transformed life” (p. 79). But how is it possible for the closure of 
nihilism to inspire a certain type of optimism, one that would 
be the driving force behind our attempt to surmount the line? 
Jünger clarifies this aspect by opposing optimism to what he 
calls defeatism, the latter being “a kind of panic in the face of 
fear, whether fear for what is ownmost and inward to the self, 
or, for what belongs outside of the sphere of the inward” (p. 80). 
Now, the experimentation of this fear brings nihilism to the 
fore in a specific manner, because it puts us in the situation of 
being aware of the fact that we have no resources to act against 
that which threatens us. In other words, we become conscious 
of our helplessness. From this point of view, nihilism, as the 
emergence of collapse, not only makes us the objects of this 
collapse, but, in doing so, thanks to the defeatist 
experimentation of fear, makes itself visible. If this holds, then 
some kind of diagnosis of nihilism would be possible, which in 
turn would put forward “a demand for its transformation” (p. 
82).     
  Heidegger’s main concern with Jünger’s position, a 
concern expressed in a letter, one that was published with the 
title Zur Seinsfrage, is the way in which Jünger employs the 
metaphor of the line, because for him, the moment through 
which it is surpassed is not as important as the moment of its 
closure in itself. In other words, Heidegger is concerned with 
the essence of nihilism, with the how of its appearance. As long 
as nihilism is already an answer to the question of essence in 
general, one that points to things as being precisely nothing, 
then to put its essence into question is to ask “what it means in 
nihilism to answer nothing to the question of what it means to 
be” (p. 97). Heidegger’s aim here is to take seriously the 
nothingness of nihilism, an endeavor which Jünger simply 
failed to accomplish. Now, Jünger is not to blame for this 
failure, because his task was radically different: he tried to see 
if it is possible to surpass the line, which in turn implied the 
necessity of a diagnosis. To give a diagnosis in this case is to 
take up certain descriptions of what may be called, for example, 
the “moral situation of humanity”, a description designed to pin 
down those signs that set apart the devaluation – the 
Nietzschean trait is obvious here – which is specific to nihilism. BOOK REVIEWS 
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Not taking the nothingness of nihilism seriously is equivalent 
to this very descriptive task, because, on the one hand, it was 
necessary for nihilism to come to fulfillment so as to undertake 
it and, on the other hand, if it is fulfilled, then all your 
descriptions will be marked by nihilistic optics, a fact that 
would put nihilism itself in a blind spot. This is what Dodd calls 
the “invisibility of nihilism”. In contrast to this, Heidegger’s 
serious attitude towards nihilism amounts to an inversion of 
Jünger’s schemata: instead of surpassing the line, it would be 
advisable to stay on the line, as Heidegger suggests, taking up 
the nothingness on its own terms, because “perhaps the 
nothing, the abandonment of being itself, holds in itself the 
potential for a gathering of possibility that passes beyond what 
has otherwise come to rest on the line” (p. 103).   
At this point, Dodd contrasts Sartre’s viewpoint on 
violence, as the affirmation of the inessentiality of things, to the 
implication that Heidegger’s conception of nihilism has on 
violence. In a certain sense, Sartre’s scheme portrays violence 
as being constitutive. Heidegger’s idea of nihilism reserves no 
special place for violence, for to take nihilism seriously is to 
affirm that all there is “is” for nothing. In this context, violence 
can be conceived only as a means, which is to say an instrument 
for nothing.  
This is the background of Dodd’s discussion about 
Patočka’s conception of violence. It is worth mentioning that in 
Heretical Essays, the matter of the line is also present. But 
Patočka’s concern with this metaphor does not end up with a 
conception of it as a culmination and passage (Jünger), or as 
the origin of the meaning of being (Heidegger). The line which 
is at the centre of Patočka’s attention is the front line specific to 
any war, in this case being a metaphor which expresses the 
distance between those that stay and those that go to war, thus 
sacrificing their lives for peace. The possibility of sacrifice 
marks somehow the fact that, as long as life can sacrifice itself, 
there is something that transcends it, a fact that indicates an 
alternative to a life lived only for itself. The violence which is 
specific to the front line and which is experienced by those that 
stay in line makes possible “not a loss of the self, but a peak of 
the self” (p. 129). Again, this peak secures for those that are META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – II (1) / 2010 
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willing – for Patočka to die on the front line is an act of 
absolute freedom – to sacrifice their lives, an existence that 
breaks the meaningless cycle of a life pursued only for itself. 
Life at the peak is the source of what Patočka calls the 
“solidarity of the shaken”, which in turn makes possible for the 
insight gained by those on the line “to reach far beyond the 
confines of an individual’s experience” (p. 131). Therefore, 
violence can become constitutive, providing that the 
intersubjective insight could be the source of a world that 
overcame the inauthenticity of the profane. 
Thus ends my brief presentation of Dodd’s argument. In 
the end of this review, it must be stated that Violence and 
Phenomenology  is not a mere collection of conceptions of 
violence. As seen, for example, the argument just presented is 
marked essentially by a guiding line: the idea that violence 
must be either a means or a constitutive event functions as a 
hermeneutical principle, one that allows Dodd to get a specific 
perspective on the texts discussed. 
 
 
Address: 
Tudor Cosma Purnavel 
Al.I. Cuza University of Iasi 
Department of Philosophy 
Bd. Carol I, 11 
700506 Iasi, Romania 
E-mail: tudor.cosma@yahoo.com 